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The Future of the Grave Breaches Regime: 
Segregate, Assimilate or Abandon? 




The grave breaches regime has three possible futures. In the first, the regime remains segregated 
from other categories of war crimes in deference to the historical development of these crimes. 
This future, however, is one that will see a relatively dramatic decline in the use of grave breaches 
in practice, primarily because other offences cover the same acts more efficiently. In the second 
possible future, the grave breaches are entirely abandoned, but this eventuality seems both 
improbable and undesirable. Even though judicial pragmatism has diminished aspects of the grave 
breaches regime that were once unique, grave breaches still offer important features over and 
above all alternatives. The grave breaches regime is therefore unlikely to disappear entirely. A 
third possible future involves assimilating the grave breaches with other categories of war crimes, 
ideally through the promulgation of a more coherent treaty regime. In the short term, this 
proposition appears politically untenable, leaving judges to unify the stark disparities between 
grave breaches and other war crimes. A future that continues to adopt this course will nonetheless 
pose serious problems for the discipline in the years to come. Over the longer term, a treaty 
creating a more comprehensive code governing all war crimes is therefore inevitable. 
 
1. Introduction 
In August 1949, states stunned by a second world war in less than half a century signed four 
conventions that signaled a veritable revolution for the concept of war crimes. At the end of each 
of the four Geneva Conventions, three provisions not only designated certain violations of the laws 
of war as ‘grave breaches’, they also took the unprecedented step of compelling states to pass 
criminal legislation implementing these breaches into domestic criminal law and obliging 
signatories to search for and prosecute those responsible ‘regardless of their nationality.’ Relative 
to earlier notions of war crimes, the grave breaches regime was nothing short of a ‘quantum leap’.1 
																																								 																				
* Assistant Professor, University of British Columbia. Formerly Appeals Counsel, Office of the Prosecutor, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Chair, Editorial Committee of this Journal. Kind thanks 
to Nicole Barrett, Antonio Cassese, Robin Geiss, Simon Meisenberg, Yasmin Naqvi and Sandy Sivakumaran for 
invaluable critique of an earlier draft. Errors remain entirely my own. 
1 G. Abi-Saab, ‘The Concept of ‘War Crimes’, in Sienho Yee and Wang Tieya (eds), International Law in the Post-
Cold War World (Routledge: London, 2001), at 104. 
		
War crimes were prosecuted and punished at Nuremberg and before, but the grave breaches regime 
enjoyed the distinction of being the first treaty codifying war crimes. It represented a bold 
determination that the world would no longer tolerate the travesty of sham trials at Leipzig after 
World War One (WWI),2 nor hear arguments that post-war justice administered at Nuremberg or 
Tokyo amounted to little more than novel law selectively visited on a vanquished enemy.3 From 
now on, war criminals would be sought everywhere, called to answer to national courts, and 
dispassionately punished in accordance with pre-existing law.  
None of these ambitions were quickly realized. For the better part of a century, the grave 
breaches regime was not just imperfect, it remained totally inoperative. Several decades after grave 
breaches were formally adopted, one author explained that ‘[t]he reasons why there have been no 
prosecutions for ‘grave breaches’ are partly technical, born of the legal complexities and 
uncertainties in the Geneva Conventions, but more substantially, they lie in the area of 
international politics and the hard facts of military situations.’4 On the political side of this 
equation, fear of retribution against nationals detained by the adversary prevented belligerent states 
from initiating war crimes proceedings against enemies in their custody,5 and the agenda of third 
states was generally circumscribed by allegiance to competing superpowers.6 On a technical level, 
the Geneva Conventions had failed to define grave breaches with any meaningful degree of 
precision, such that states had little assistance in navigating an often complex set of rules that must 
be interpreted to prosecute grave breaches. Arguably, this was intentional. The Geneva 
Conventions themselves furnished ‘only keywords to designate a criminal act, nothing which can 
be called a definition,’7 thereby leaving a range of indispensable criminal concepts ‘under a cloud 
of obscurity.’8 Despite the lofty promise of justice, the grave breaches regime was stymied from 
the outset.  
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At the end of the Cold War, courts finally breathed life into a grave breaches regime that 
had earlier appeared little more than a ‘dead letter’.9 The rise of a hegemonic global order enabled 
the establishment of various international criminal courts and tribunals, which in turn stimulated 
domestic appetite for war crimes prosecutions. This process was not foreseen at the time the 
Geneva Conventions were signed—during the negotiation of the grave breaches regime, states 
elected to simply list the names of the various grave breaches on the understanding that ‘[t]he 
Conference is not making international penal law but is undertaking to insert in the national penal 
laws certain acts enumerated as grave breaches of the Convention, which will become crimes when 
they have been inserted in the national penal laws’.10 But by the turn of the new millennium, 
international courts and not their domestic counterparts had taken the lead in interpreting, defining 
and applying almost the full panoply of grave breaches as listed in the Geneva Conventions, from 
unlawful confinement of civilians to deportation from occupied territory.11 As a consequence, the 
grave breaches regime is now complemented by a prodigious body of jurisprudence derived in 
large part from international courts, even though those assembled at Geneva anticipated that 
domestic courts would fulfill this function much sooner. Predicting the future of the grave breaches 
regime is no easier now.  
Nonetheless, this article assesses three possible futures for the grave beaches regime in 
light of current developments within the discipline. The first of these supposes the continued 
segregation of the grave breaches regime from other categories of war crimes in accordance with 
the historical development of the laws of war. As the first section of this article shows, a future of 
this sort accords with the current state of the law, but it inevitably leads to seriously diminished 
use of the grave breaches regime in practice. The second possible future involves abandoning the 
grave breaches regime as pragmatic changes in customary law governing other wartime offences 
and more recent developments in international criminal justice threaten to supersede the grave 
breaches regime. To a certain extent, this future is already upon us. The third and final possible 
future involves an assimilation of the various categories of war crimes into a single, coherent and 
comprehensive body of law governing wartime criminality. In essence, this future involves 
rewriting war crimes afresh. As the negotiators to the Geneva Conventions would now testify, 
which of these futures will ultimately prevail is impossible to predict. Nevertheless, we can be sure 
that the future of the grave breaches regime will represent a tension between the historical origins 
of the crimes, pragmatic attempts at overcoming the formal technicalities that attach to these 
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offences and an ongoing quest for greater coherence within the law governing war crimes 
generally.  
 
2. The Continued Segregation of the Grave Breaches Regime 
Grave breaches are but one species of war crimes. The first and older category of offences were 
known as ‘violations of the laws and customs of war.’ Prior to the inception of the grave breaches 
regime, the term violations of the laws and customs of war referred to the laws of war generally,12 
but the idea that violations of certain of these rules constituted criminal offences derived from 
custom. As a result, customary law formed the legal basis for ‘violations of the laws and customs 
of war’ charged after WWI,13 and again inspired the charters of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals a matter of decades later.14 In the wake of World War Two (WWII), however, the grave 
breaches regime promulgated a separate but overlapping series of treaty-based war crimes, thereby 
creating a second category of wartime criminality. Two categories of war crimes then became 
three when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) declared that 
violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II constitute 
a separate class of war crime applicable in international and non-international armed conflict 
alike.15 Then finally, to complete a relatively sophisticated legal kaleidoscope, treaties governing 
specific aspects of wartime conduct, such as the protection of cultural property, created a fourth 
category of war crimes.16 A future that maintains these categories represents a continuation of the 
status quo, where groups of war crimes are segregated from one another.  
This segregation stems from history. At each stage in the development of war crimes, states 
simply added layer upon layer of new law without repealing earlier overlapping or redundant 
																																								 																				
12 The official title of the Brussels Declaration of 1874, for instance, was the ‘Project of an International Declaration 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874.’ Similarly, The Hague Regulations of 1907 
were termed ‘Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.’ 
13 According to the Commission of Responsibilities established in the wake of WWI, ‘[t]wo classes of culpable acts 
present themselves: (a) Acts which provoked the world war and accompanied its inception. (b) Violations of the laws 
and customs of war and the laws of humanity.’ See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
on Enforcement of Penalties, reprinted in 14 AJIL (1920), at 118. 
14 Art. 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter stipulated that ‘[t]he following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: ‘War crimes: ‘namely, violations of 
the laws or customs of war.’ (emphasis added). The equivalent within the Toyko Tribunal’s Charter mentioned 
‘Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war’. The offences were defined with 
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criminal liability explicitly. See B. Röling and R. Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, Vol. I, Appendix D (Amsterdam: APA-
University Press Amsterdam, 1977). 
15 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Tadić (IT-94-1), Appeals Chamber, 2 
October 1995, (Tadić Appeal Judgement), §§ 128-136. 
16 Article 15(2) of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict concerning ‘Serious violations of this Protocol’ provides that ‘Each Party shall adopt 
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equivalents. States were adamant, for instance, that the grave breaches regime in no way repudiated 
the ‘violations of laws and customs of war’ punished as war crimes at Nuremberg, even though 
these earlier war crimes were ‘practically all covered in the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I’17. In the same vein, states involved in the codification of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Statute adopted the segregated, compartmentalized, and less than coherent distinction 
between the various overlapping historical categories of wartime offences, perpetuating what 
Meron once described as ‘a crazy quilt of norms’.18 As a consequence of this tendency to 
continually add layers of law without consolidating the law into a coherent whole, grave breaches 
are now but one of four disassociated categories of war crime.19 One possible future for the grave 
breaches regime involves continued segregation along these historical lines. And yet, maintenance 
of the current divisions between grave breaches and other war crimes will inevitably lead to a 
relatively dramatic decline in the use of grave breaches. 
 Quite simply, other offences are easier to prove. Already, prosecutors choose to charge 
acts that amount to grave breaches as domestic crimes, violations of military regulations or other 
war crimes,20 partly in a bid to avoid a range of technicalities specific to the grave breaches regime. 
Most importantly, grave breaches only apply during international armed conflict.21 Where crimes 
that would constitute grave breaches occur in connection with direct hostilities between two 
warring states, establishing the international armed conflict is unlikely to prove especially 
troublesome. The torture at Abu Ghraib, for instance, was undoubtedly a grave breach. And yet a 
large portion of modern armed conflicts involve so-called internationalized armed conflicts, where 
foreign governments adopt domestic proxies as their military agents.22 The now prolific incidence 
of these internationalized armed conflicts poses special problems for the future of the grave 
breaches regime, since application of the Geneva Conventions to internationalized warfare 
requires prosecutors to prove highly complex questions of fact about the relationship between rebel 
groups and their foreign sponsor. In particular, a foreign state must exercise overall control over a 
rebel army in order to internationalize an armed conflict, which is only established when a state 
has ‘a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in 
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group’. 23 In 
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19 Bassiouni, supra note 17, at 232. 
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The Law of War (Cambridge University Press: London, 2002), at 40. See also L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed 
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23 Tadić Appeal Judgement, supra note 15, § 137. 
		
a wide variety of circumstances, the difficulties associated with proving propositions of this 
complexity outweigh the benefits of charging grave breaches.  
For one reason, states tend to zealously conceal their role in fomenting foreign rebellion, 
such that merely obtaining the proof necessary to prosecute grave breaches often borders on the 
impossible. As the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo discovered during the Armed 
Activities Case before the International Court of Justice, proving that the Mouvement pour le 
Liberation de Congo (MLC) was under the control of the Ugandan government can be 
demanding24, even when this relationship is not the subject of serious political dispute.25 The need 
to prove overall control is, of course, even more onerous within criminal proceedings where higher 
standards of proof apply. Moreover, the rationale for undergoing this burden is weak when overall 
control is irrelevant to the moral culpability of the accused—acts of pillage, murder or rape 
perpetrated by the MLC are just as reprehensive regardless of whether or not a foreign state 
supports them. And yet in order to charge grave breaches in these circumstances, it is ‘necessary 
to collect evidence and litigate on complex issues, such as the role of third states, when ultimately 
this has no bearing on the role and liability of the perpetrator.’26 Thus, in addition to the frequently 
insurmountable difficulty of obtaining the requisite proof to establish overall control, opting to 
prosecute wartime offences as grave breaches creates an overriding danger that a wholly culpable 
accused is acquitted, only because of a failure to establish issues as contentious as foreign control 
over the perpetrators. 
Grave breaches are also more politically sensitive than other war crimes, since proving an 
international conflict often involves exposing the meddling of a powerful foreign state. In some 
instances, doing so is politically untenable. One might fairly anticipate, for instance, that members 
of the Angolan rebel group UNITA would not be charged with grave breaches on the theory that 
their offences occurred within a conflict that was internationalized through American and South 
African patronage during the Cold War,27 especially when other crimes allow an assessment of 
culpability without implicating the rebels’ puppet-masters. One can certainly posit scenarios 
whereby prosecuting grave breaches might be politically advantageous for certain powers 
(prosecuting Hariri’s assailants for grave breaches as a means of exposing Syrian implication 
would be one example), but in a large number of instances the political ramifications of charging 
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rebel groups or their adversaries with grave breaches impede rather than promote accountability. 
These impediments will be just as significant in the future, as increased economic interdependence 
born of globalization, the development of nuclear capabilities among previously incapable states, 
the greater incidence of terrorism in Western countries and the increasing scarcity of natural 
resources, all provide continuing incentives for foreign intervention in domestic conflicts.  
The notion of victimhood that is specific to the grave breaches regime will also compel 
prosecutors to favor simpler criminal offences over the grave breaches. One of the distinctive 
characteristics of the grave breaches as originally conceived, was the division of victims between 
wounded and sick, shipwrecked, prisoners of war and ‘protected persons’. As a number of authors 
in this edition have pointed out, the term ‘protected persons’ was never synonymous with civilians. 
Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV defines protected person status based on the nationality of the 
victim, the role of their home state in the surrounding hostilities and the adequacy of diplomatic 
protections.28 As is well known, the ICTY interpreted this nationality requirement as implying 
‘allegiances’,29 in order to ensure that the grave breaches regime still applied during 
internationalized armed conflict, in which rebel perpetrators and their governmental adversaries 
share the same nationality. But even on the controversial reinterpretation of protected person status 
offered by the ICTY, prosecutors who prefer to charge offences as grave breaches will still be 
required to tender evidence about the ‘allegiance’ of the victim, the role of their country of origin 
in hostilities and whether or not they enjoyed ‘effective and satisfactory diplomatic 
representation’.30 Already, the sheer extent and complexity of this law deters use of the grave 
breaches regime, when comparable categories of war crime, domestic offences or military 
regulations cover the same acts without requiring proof of protected person status. In the future, 
prosecutors will prefer these simpler alternatives.  
Debates concerning unlawful combatant status are likely to compound the comparative 
disadvantage of the grave breaches regime as compared with these other overlapping criminal 
offences, further undermining the value of a segregated grave breaches regime. One of the 
principal concerns is that based on the United States’ (US) definition, unlawful combatants cannot 
be victims of grave breaches. To recall, in the wake of terrorist attacks in New York, the US 
government unveiled a status inaccurately deemed ‘unlawful combatancy’, premised on the notion 
that ‘technically unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention [sic]’.31 
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Critiques of the legal slight-of-hand that underpins this position are numerous,32 but there is less 
recognition that these arguments also imply that unlawful combatants cannot be victims of grave 
breaches. The logic is simple. If unlawful combatants have no rights under the Geneva 
Conventions, they technically cannot be victims of the criminal offences enshrined in those 
Conventions, no matter the gravity of the abuse. Thankfully, war crimes jurisprudence has 
categorically refuted this reasoning,33 but prosecuting grave breaches in the future might still 
require courts to engage a deeply polarized, highly technical and frequently confused debate. When 
faced with this prospect, many prosecutors will look to alternative offences that avoid these 
technicalities entirely.  
And even absent these sorts of legal or political impediments, the added cost of proving 
the technicalities associated with grave breaches further undermines the likely that acts amounting 
to grave breaches will be enforced as such. International criminal justice is, after all, subject to at 
times justified criticism for the unacceptable length of trials and intense pressure to minimize 
spending. In both respects, the added elements specific to grave breaches create costs that a nascent 
system of international justice can ill-afford. These constraints are likely to persist into the future, 
leading both courts and prosecutors to frame their accusations within less onerous categories of 
offence. To a certain extent, this situation is already the norm. In more than one instance, judges 
at the ICTY have openly encouraged the Prosecution to withdraw grave breaches charges with 
‘due regard to reducing the amount of trial time needed to address the Defence denial of the 
international nature of the armed conflict’.34 As we will observe below, other war crimes are 
increasingly perceived as better alternatives insofar as they avoid these technicalities. Thus, to the 
extent that the grave breaches regime remains isolated from other categories of war crimes, fettered 
by technicalities that are not relevant to the moral culpability of the accused, or plagued by the 
unlawful combatant debarcle, it appears to face a relatively bleak future. A grave breaches regime 
that remains segregated from other categories of war crime will suffer a diminished role in practice.  
 
3. Abandoning the Grave Breaches Regime 
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In another possible future, the grave breaches regime could face outright abandonment. A demise 
of these proportions would not be entirely foreign to the laws of war. The grave breaches regime 
might, for example, be relegated to a status vaguely reminiscent of the Protecting Powers 
provisions within the same Conventions, which boldly promised that independent third states and 
organizations would supervise compliance with the laws of war but ultimately fell into desuetude 
after an extremely limited application in practice.35 Elements of the grave breaches regime have 
already endured a similar fate. The provision within the grave breaches regime that contemplates 
an enquiry procedure and appointment of an umpire to investigate grave breaches has all but 
disappeared from even expert discussion,36 not to mention the inactivity of the fact-finding 
Commission established by Additional Protocol I for similar purposes.37 Given the appreciable 
burden of proving the technicalities associated with grave breaches, it is at least plausible that 
grave breaches will again become a ‘dead letter’ in the future. And at the risk of sounding slightly 
alarmist, certain current trends inevitably lead to a partial downfall of this sort.  
Recent developments in the law governing other categories of war crimes supersede 
aspects of the grave breaches regime. In particular, courts have extended the application of 
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to a point where it threatens to almost single-
handedly eclipse the grave breaches regime. Originally, common Article 3 was codified as a 
‘convention within a convention’, creating a list of prohibitions one author famously described as 
‘affectionate generalities’.38 Several decades later, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared 
that common Article 3 formed ‘a minimum yardstick’ applicable in all armed conflicts, based 
principally on the premise that these prohibitions constituted ‘elementary considerations of 
humanity’.39 International criminal tribunals then embraced the same reasoning, precisely in order 
to bypass the technicalities that plague the grave breaches regime. Early in the tenure of the ICTY, 
the Tadić Jurisdiction Decision declared that ‘at least with respect to the minimum rules in 
common Article 3, the character of the conflict is irrelevant.’40 As a result, a single provision within 
the Geneva Conventions that was not originally intended to apply in international armed conflict, 
let alone give rise to individual criminal responsibility, is now poised to overshadow the once 
revolutionary criminal regime explicitly enshrined within the Geneva Conventions. 
																																								 																				
35 For an explanation of the limited instances where the protecting powers provisions were exercised, see R. Wolfrum, 
‘Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law’, in D. Fleck and M. Bothe (eds), The Handbook of Humanitarian 
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 The consequences for the future of the grave breaches regime are marked. Common Article 
3 offers many of the benefits of grave breaches without the drawbacks. In terms of coverage, the 
two categories of war crimes share important commonalities — both criminalize wilful killing and 
murder, torture and inhuman treatment, hostage-taking, and unfair trial. Rape could also be 
prosecuted as torture under both regimes. In other respects, however, one of the two categories of 
war crimes offers distinct advantages. Whereas a grave breach presupposes proof of an 
international armed conflict, the extended conception of common Article 3 simply demands 
evidence of a ‘protracted armed conflict.’ By charging wartime offences as violations of Common 
Article 3, courts can therefore dispense with the imprecise, convoluted, and woefully inefficient 
process of qualifying international armed conflicts. Furthermore, Common Article 3 neatly 
overcomes the complexity of proving protected person status by substituting a simpler assessment 
of whether the victims were ‘not taking active part in hostilities.’ Quite understandably, domestic 
courts and international tribunals now charge war crimes as violations of common Article 3 rather 
than grave breaches as a matter of course.41 In the future, at least a portion of the grave breaches 
regime is likely to be eclipsed by these practices. 
Other jurisprudential developments are likely to have similar effects. Other categories of 
war crimes are now considered applicable in international and non-international armed conflict 
alike, which also allows courts to dispense with the need to qualify the character of the surrounding 
armed conflict. Once again, the logic is compelling in its simplicity — courts reason that if the 
content of war crimes is identical in both types of war, undergoing the arduous process of 
characterizing the nature of the conflict is superfluous. So in the trial of Naser Orić, the accused 
was charged with ‘wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages not justified by military 
necessity’, which formally derives from the Hague Regulations of 1907 and therefore international 
armed conflict, but the Tribunal summarily dispensed with the need to determine the status of the 
conflict by merely repeating the mantra that ‘[u]nder Article 3 of the [ICTY] Statute, it is 
immaterial whether the crimes alleged in the Indictment occurred within an internal or 
international armed conflict.’42 The assertion, which in this particular case remained implicit, was 
that the offence shares a common legal meaning in customary international law within both species 
of armed conflict. Consequently, citing the existence of the offence in the two contexts alleviated 
the need to characterize the surrounding war. As a result, a future without grave breaches is not 
just a fanciful hypothetical; to a certain extent it is already upon us. Why, after all, would a 
prosecutor charge the grave breach of ‘extensive destruction … not justified by military necessity 
																																								 																				
41	 This	position	has	been	consistently	adopted	ever	 since.	For	a	 selection	of	 the	most	 recent	 judgments	affirming	 this	
approach,	see	Judgement,	Naletilic	et	al,	(IT-98-34-T	),	Trial	Chamber,	31	March	2003,	§	228;	Judgement,	Mrškić	et	al,	(IT-
95-13/1-A	 ),	 Appeals	 Chamber,	 5	May	 2009,	 §	 70;	 Judgement,	Orić	 (IT-03-68-T),	 Trial	 Chamber,	 30	 June	 2006,	 §	 261;	
Judgement,	Krajišnik	(IT-00-39-T),	Trial	Chamber,	27	September	2006,	§	843.	For	domestic	practice,	see	Prosecution	v.	
Refik	Saric,	Eastern	Division	of	the	High	Court,	Third	Chamber,	25	November	1994;	Netherlands	Supreme	Court	Decision	in	the	matter	of	the	appeal	against	a	decision	of	the	Arnhem	Court	of	Appeal,	Military	Chamber,	dated	19	March	1997.	See	also	In	the	penal	case	against	Darko	Knesevic,	11	November	1997,	Criminal	Court,	No	3717	Decision,	AB	translated	at	1	Yearbook	of	International	Humanitarian	Law	(1998),	at	599-606.		
42 Orić, supra note 40, § 252. 
		
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’, when the analogous offence of ‘wanton destruction of 
cities, town or villages’ now achieves exactly the same ends without subjecting the prosecution to 
the rigors of conflict qualification required by the grave breaches regime? 
In the past, enforcement obligations unique to the grave breaches regime might have 
explained a preference for prosecuting grave breaches43, but recent experience suggests that the 
value of these enforcement obligations has also declined in significance. Take, for instance, the 
obligation to enact legislation providing for ‘effective penal sanctions’ of grave breaches. The 
received wisdom is that this obligation does not require states to criminalize grave breaches as 
such — torture can be criminalized as assault, extensive appropriation not justified by military 
necessity as theft and hostage taking as kidnapping. Even war crimes jurisprudence opines that 
‘there is no rule, either in customary or in positive international law, which obligates States to 
prosecute acts which can be characterized as war crimes solely on the basis of international 
humanitarian law, completely setting aside any characterizations of their national criminal law.’44 
While strong arguments of both law and policy might be leveled against this interpretation, the 
exceedingly lenient reading of the obligation represents prevalent views. And even though this 
obligation is so easy to satisfy, most surveys show that states have failed miserably in enacting 
criminal legislation that meets even this lax standard.45 On all accounts, abandoning such a 
conceptually weak and practically ineffectual obligation to enact legislation would probably not 
constitute a legal calamity, especially when the markedly more effective obligations contained in 
the ICC Statute compel domestic implementation of all international crimes.46  
Similarly, recent developments in international criminal law at least partially overshadow 
the obligation to search for and prosecute grave breaches. As Kress points out in his erudite 
contribution to this symposium, the obligation to search for and prosecute grave breaches cannot 
reasonably be read as absolute. In a number of situations (consider an insane perpetrator), the 
obligation gives way to established criminological principles. It is presumably in response to these 
types of limitations, that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s Customary Study 
stipulates that ‘States must investigate war crimes … over which they have jurisdiction and, if 
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appropriate, prosecute the suspects.’47 Regrettably, the term ‘if appropriate’ goes undefined. In 
the absence of clear definition, the discretion created by the term almost dilutes the obligation to 
vanishing point. We witness, for example, a plethora of extra-judicial considerations in 
determining whether to initiate charges for grave breaches, some of which reflect the legitimate 
concerns of a criminal justice system while others simply allow politics to hinder justice. 
Moreover, the complementarity regime within the ICC Statute is likely to achieve much more. 
Already the ICC’s complementarity regime has coerced British authorities into prosecuting their 
own soldiers for grave breaches perpetrated in Iraq,48 thereby evidencing an arguably greater 
influence on the enforcement of grave breaches within a single decade than the obligation to search 
for and prosecute these crimes achieved over the course of the preceding half-century. In all these 
respects, enforcement mechanisms within the grave breaches regime also face a future of declining 
value.  
Despite these relative declines in significance, outright abandonment remains improbable. 
For one reason, certain grave breaches simply have no equivalent in other categories of war crimes. 
One prime example is the grave breach of ‘unlawful confinement’, which was codified as a war 
crime for the first time in the grave breaches regime, soon after the massive incidence of illicit 
detention during WWII. As international criminal justice currently stands, unlawful confinement 
is only an offence in inter-state armed conflict. In an attempt to bridge this arbitrary normative 
divide, the Prosecution in the Limaj case argued that ‘unlawful seizure’ and ‘unlawful detention 
for prolonged periods’ during the Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) non-international armed 
conflict with Serbian forces was subsumed within the war crime of ‘cruel treatment’.49 In 
dismissing this argument, the Trial Chamber concluded that ‘at least in the circumstances of this 
case, these acts in and of themselves do not amount to a serious attack on human dignity within 
the meaning of cruel treatment’.50 The Tribunal’s conclusion is certainly open to substantive 
critique (that unlawful confinement is a grave breach in international armed conflict is the most 
blatant retort), but the decision does highlight how creative charging is sometimes necessary in an 
attempt to counter the fact that certain grave breaches have no direct equivalent elsewhere in the 
laws of war. Unlawful confinement is far from alone in this regard, meaning that abandoning the 
grave breaches regime would result in a marked diminution of established categories of 
international criminal responsibility. Certain states will surely oppose a regulatory regression of 
this type. 
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The mere fact that grave breaches are formally codified and universally ratified is another 
reason why these war crimes will survive. As the infamous history of the US Military 
Commissions Act 2006 (MCA) confirms, grave breaches are less easily manipulated than other 
war crimes. In 2006, the US Congress hurriedly passed the MCA in response to the US Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hamdan, which  ruled that the first incarnation of military commissions 
established by President Bush transgressed common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.51 After 
Hamdan, the then US Administration suddenly realized that by implication they were perpetrating 
war crimes — the US War Crimes Act of 1996 render violations of common Article 3 federal 
crimes. Thus, in an attempt to minimize their exposure to potentially serious criminal liability, the 
Administration surreptitiously used the MCA to amend the portion of the US War Crimes Act that 
criminalized the relevant aspects of common Article 3.52 To feint legitimacy, the MCA created the 
concept of ‘grave breaches of common Article 3’, which marked an unprecedented collapse of two 
categories of war crimes that had epitomized the discipline’s segregated history.  
The marriage of the two categories of war crime was not fortuitous — the novel notion of 
‘grave breaches of common Article 3’ excluded precisely the components of common Article 3 
that actors within the ‘war on terror’ had unquestionably violated as a matter of routine, namely 
the ‘denial of the right to a fair trial’ and the prohibition against ‘outrages upon personal dignity, 
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.53 And yet strangely, Congress failed to 
simultaneously amend aspects of the US War Crimes Act that also criminalize grave breaches.54 
The oversight was perplexing since grave breaches not only cover precisely those aspects of 
Common Article 3 that the US government repealed,55 they also criminalizes a wider array of 
practices synonymous with the ‘War on Terror.’56 In short, the attempt to repeal offences the US 
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Government was perpetrating was only partially achieved. One might speculate about the rationale 
for this half-measure, but the explicit codification of grave breaches within the Geneva 
Conventions, as opposed to the customary nature of criminal liability for violations of common 
Article 3, arguably narrowed the opportunity for further legal distortion.  
The explicit nature of the grave breaches regime is equally valuable in other contexts, again 
highlighting grounds for resisting calls to discard grave breaches in the future. In the Basson case, 
amnesties and jurisdictional barriers impeded various attempts at prosecuting a doctor who had 
directed South Africa’s secret chemical and biological warfare project during the apartheid era.57 
As Ferdinandusse highlights, the South African Constitutional Court made explicit reference to 
the obligation to search for and prosecute in the grave breaches regime by declaring that these 
barriers raised constitutional issues.58 Although Prosecutors ultimately decided not to proceed with 
a retrial, the case does demonstrate how explicit wording in a universally agreed treaty contributes 
to the likelihood of accountability in the face of trenchant political opposition. The lesson is 
important for the future. If the history of the grave breaches regime has reaffirmed anything about 
war crimes prosecutions, it is surely that we must expect the type of political resistance to 
accountability epitomized by apartheid South Africa or a US government responsible for various 
grave breaches at Guantánamo. As these two examples reveal, the causes and extent of a regime’s 
responsibility for war crimes can be radically different from one context to the next, but the 
underlying resistance to accountability is relatively predictable. The grave breaches regime, 
therefore, retains important value over and above other international and domestic offences. And 
if the past is any guide, every obligation capable of leveraging prosecutions will be vital in 
counteracting the culture of impunity future generations will inherit. 
Universal jurisdiction within the grave breaches regime is similar. As numerous authors in 
this symposium have shown, the grave breaches regime contains an important provision 
demanding that states party ‘enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions’ 
for grave breaches, and compels these same states to search for and prosecute those responsible 
‘regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.’59 O’Keefe’s exhaustive assessment of this 
somewhat ambiguous language confirms that the provision creates a truly universal jurisdiction.60 
This result undeniably contrasts with the opinions of certain ICJ judges who are openly less 
enthused,61 but even if the language contained in the Geneva Conventions is less than clear in this 
regard, those responsible for drafting the provision unambiguously intended that ‘the principal of 
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universality should be applied here.’62 At least as regards international armed conflict, the notion 
of mandatory universal jurisdiction over grave breaches is therefore unavoidable.  
By contrast, the existence and scope of a customary equivalent applicable to all categories 
of war crimes is less clear. A public interchange between the US State Department and the ICRC 
on these issues bears out this proposition in practice. While the US government’s detailed response 
to the ICRC’s Customary Study acknowledged that the grave breaches regime creates universal 
jurisdiction,63 it retorted that ‘State practice does not support the contention that States, as a matter 
of customary international law, have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts 
over the full set of actions defined by the study as ‘war crimes.’’64 As we see from this position, 
grave breaches continue to serve an important declaratory function within the modern architecture 
of international criminal law—whereas one can question the customary nature of particular 
provisions in the laws of war, the explicit codification of the grave breaches regime precludes 
serious debate. As powerful states continue to pressure countries like Belgium, Spain and others 
to repudiate domestic codifications of universal jurisdiction in years to come, the grave breaches 
regime will therefore act as one source of continued resistance.  
So for all these reasons, the grave breaches regime appears destined to endure, albeit as 
part of an increasingly complex mosaic of law governing war crimes. Only the need for greater 
coherence and clarity within and between the various categories of war crimes will lead to the 
abolition of grave breaches. 
 
4. Assimilating the Grave Breaches Regime with Other War Crimes 
The third possible future is one where the grave breaches regime is assimilated with other 
categories of wartime offence to produce a clearer, unified and coherent body of law organized 
around principle not history. In essence, this future involves rewriting the law of war crimes afresh. 
Changes would be legion. A more systematic taxonomy would avoid the frequent duplication of 
war crimes that share identical meanings, such as inhuman treatment and cruel treatment.65 Along 
the same lines, a unified law governing war crimes would dispense with antiquated language that 
has no bearing on the content of the modern criminal offence, instead of repeating confusing 
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phraseology like ‘pillaging a town or place even when taken by assault’.66 But most fundamentally, 
a unified law of war crimes would discard unduly complex and morally irrelevant categories of 
victimhood (like protected persons status), and part with the discredited divide between 
international and non-international armed conflict most commentators condemn as ‘retrograde’.67 
War crimes should be organized around their substantive content, not their historical genesis.68 
Ideally, a new multilateral treaty will fulfill this function, but this eventuality appears politically 
implausible in the short term. The fear that renegotiating the Geneva Conventions in the present 
political climate will result in less humanitarian protections than are presently the case, coupled 
with the difficulties of amending the ICC Statute, are likely to inhibit the formal codification of 
new laws that supersede the grave breaches regime. As a consequence, at least in the near future, 
judges will give effect to the commonly-held desires for greater simplicity and coherence in the 
law governing war crimes.  
Predictably, this will pose problems. One of the most obvious difficulties in leaving courts 
to affect legal change within a body of criminal law is that the admirable desire for coherence risks 
jeopardizing fair trial rights, especially the prohibition against retroactive criminal law. The law 
governing deportation illustrates this tension. As things presently stand, deportation must occur 
within occupied territory in order to constitute a grave breach, whereas the equivalent in non-
international armed conflict is limited to ‘ordering the displacement of the civilian population’.69  
The distinction is hugely important in practice. As a simplistic illustration, members of the Gestapo 
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who forcibly evicted Jews from occupied territories throughout Western Europe perpetrated what 
now amounts to a grave breach, but only those political or military leaders who ordered the 
displacement could be criminally culpable had the events occurred in a civil war. The illustration 
is, of course, facile insofar as it obscures the fact that the two offences came into force 
approximately half a century apart—the grave breach of deportation was codified in 1949 whereas 
the equivalent in non-international armed conflict was only criminalized for the first time within 
the ICC Statute. Thus, it might be safe to conclude that the forcible eviction of civilian populations 
from strategic areas adjacent to Vietnam during the US-led carpet bombing of Cambodia was a 
grave breach,70 but it is less clear that even ordering displacement during the Biafran civil conflict 
within Nigeria at the same time was a war crime. A future that uses jurisprudence to harmonize 
these discrepancies is certainly intellectually attractive on one level, but it will also mark a 
potentially unconscious and philosophically troubling regression to Nuremberg, where the 
principle of nullem crimen sine lege was reduced to a mere ‘principle of justice’.71  
In a similar sense, assimilating the grave breaches regime with other categories of war 
crime through jurisprudence might lead to a kind of legal stalemate in concrete cases. This is 
particularly true of the new practice of dispensing with the qualification of the armed conflict when 
the content of the offence is perceived as identical in both contexts.72 Milan Martić, for example, 
was convicted of cruel treatment for the injuries sustained by seven members of Croatian Armed 
Forces during an indiscriminate rocket attack he launched against the city of Zagreb.73 The Trial 
Chamber found that these seven victims were ‘off-duty’,74 and that Martić could therefore be 
criminally responsible for injuries they sustained during the attack. Unfortunately, this approach 
overlooks the fact that soldiers ‘off duty’ are legitimate targets in one type of conflict but not the 
other.75 A terrible impasse arises. In accordance with the new hybrid approach to qualification, the 
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Martić Trial Chamber reasoned that the offence of ‘cruel treatment’ applies in both types of armed 
conflict, then dispensed with the need to qualify the nature of the surrounding hostilities. But 
without a determination of armed conflict’s character, it was analytically impossible to determine 
which of these competing legal standards applied to the ‘off-duty’ soldiers, and therefore whether 
or not the acts in question were criminally reprehensible. The consequences, for both Milan Martić 
and international criminal justice, were grave. The former was convicted of a war crime in the face 
of irreconcilable legal ambiguity, while the later championed a simpler hybrid conception of armed 
conflict without recognizing the potentially sobering consequences. Courts minded to assimilate 
war crimes in the future risk reproducing the oversight. 
Apart from the threat of wrongful conviction, assimilating war crimes through 
jurisprudence also risks infidelity to the underlying law of war.  These trends too, have already 
manifest in practice. The hybrid approach of conflict qualification, for instance, disregards whether 
the conflict is international or otherwise in the name of simplicity, by demanding only that ‘(i) the 
armed violence is protracted and (ii) the parties to the conflict are organized’.76 But by requiring 
that armed conflicts are protracted, the unified standard imposes an intensity requirement derived 
from the definition of non-international armed conflict on the law governing international armed 
conflict, even though inter-state warfare has never depended on a similar degree of intensity.77 In 
addition, the unified standard also overlooks divergent definitions of non-international armed 
conflict. Additional Protocol II explicitly stipulates that organized armed groups must ‘exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and to implement this Protocol’, and a range of modern courts still insist on 
this requirement when dealing with war crimes derived from Additional Protocol II.78 Dispensing 
with these types of incongruities is undoubtedly essential for a simpler, more coherent 
understanding of war crimes, but achieving this coherence through jurisprudence rather than treaty 
leads to a future where international criminal law only approximately comports with the laws of 
war upon which they depend.  
Interpretative difficulties are, likewise, highly probable in a future where courts harmonize 
the various categories of war crimes. Commentators are presently split, for instance, on whether 
																																								 																				
76 Judgement, Haradinaj et al, (IT-04-84-T), Trial Chamber, 3 April 2008, § 38. 
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universal jurisdiction attaches to war crimes perpetrated within non-international armed conflict. 
Some argue that no rule of international law enables universal jurisdiction over war crimes in non-
international armed conflict,79 whereas others assert that states enjoy a discretion to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes perpetrated in non-international armed conflict.80 Neither 
position is entirely satisfying. On the one hand, those who deny the right to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes in non-international armed conflict reaffirm a stark disparity between 
the criminal regimes governing war crimes in international and non-international armed conflict. 
On the other, those who argue for a discretionary right to exercise universal jurisdiction do not go 
far enough, since they contradict the mandatory system of universal jurisdiction contained in the 
grave breaches regime. The dissonance creates intractable interpretative dilemmas. The ICRC, for 
example, stipulates that ‘[s]tates have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts 
over war crimes’,81 tacitly obfuscating the positive duty to exercise universal jurisdiction within 
the grave breaches regime. A future that involves incremental assimilation through interpretation 
rather than a new negotiated treaty is prone to create more of these sorts of anomalies. 
Arguing that the entire grave breaches regime applies in non-international armed conflict 
is not likely to improve matters. In a highly influential separate opinion within the Tadić 
Jurisdiction Decision, Judge Abi-Saab argued that either a teleological interpretation of the 
Geneva Conventions or a new parallel customary rule could render the entire grave breaches 
regime applicable in both types of conflict.82 The reasoning laudably embraced the need for 
‘rationalisation’ of the law governing war crimes and ‘a modicum of order among the categories 
of crimes’.83 As Moir points out in his convincing appraisal of this argument,84 the approach is 
intuitively attractive but substantively problematic. Most fundamentally, the reasoning ignores that 
several of the grave breaches could not function in non-international armed conflicts. For example, 
the grave breach of deportation must originate from occupied territory, which does not exist in 
civil wars. Likewise, the grave breach of unlawful confinement is predicated on provisions in the 
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Geneva Convention IV allowing administrative detention without trial, but the law governing non-
international armed conflict contains no equivalents. In fact, some grave breaches would be lawful 
if perpetrated in a civil war.85 As a result, importing the entire grave breaches regime into non-
international armed conflict would then require courts to decipher which grave breaches could 
apply in non-international armed conflict and which could not. In all likelihood, this merely adds 
a new layer of analytical complexity to a body of law that already risks serious over-complication. 
As a result, this and the other anecdotal examples highlighted, show how achieving coherence 
through jurisprudence rather than a treaty is fused with ongoing challenges for the future.   
 
5. Conclusion 
During the negotiation of the Geneva Conventions, state representatives unanimously 
agreed that ‘the aim was not to produce a penal code.’86 Promulgating a new consolidated treaty 
that produces a comprehensive code governing war crimes generally is politically inopportune in 
the near future, but the greatest legacy of the grave breaches regime is one where it is viewed as a 
bold catalyst for a much more structurally coherent, comprehensive and simply drafted treaty 
regime governing war criminality. All other futures are flawed. Abandoning the grave breaches 
regime, for example, would lead to loss of certain grave breaches that have no equivalent in other 
categories of war crimes, not to mention the fact that discarding the regime entirely leads to the 
disappearance of the explicit enforcement obligations that are not paralleled elsewhere. At the 
same time, maintaining the status quo also has serious shortcomings—continuing to segregate 
grave breaches from other categories of war crimes will result in the decreased application of grave 
breaches as prosecutors substitute other offences that cover the same acts more efficiently. Perhaps 
more importantly, continued segregation leaves courts to give effect to the widely-held desire for 
greater clarity, coherence and simplicity in the law governing war crimes generally. 
Commentators, after all, are virtually unanimous that ‘there ought to be no distinction between the 
criminality of offenses committed in civil wars and those committed in interstate wars,’87 and there 
is also increasing recognition that ‘[i]t makes more sense to categorize the different crimes from a 
substantive point of view.’88  
At least in theory, jurisprudence could slowly achieve these desires, but allowing courts to 
create a new unified law governing war crimes risks violating fair trial rights, creating a body of 
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international criminal law that only superficially corresponds with the underlying laws of war, and 
distorting understandings of an already overly-complicated discipline. The proliferation of courts 
prepared to hear these cases, and the inevitable fragmentation of interpretations risk substantiating 
Baxter’s fears that ‘the whole of the law of war … is becoming too complex and too much a 
lawyer’s providence.’89 As we have seen, only assimilation of the various categories of war crimes 
within a new treaty regime adequately responds to these concerns. And although consolidating the 
laws of war within a single new treaty regime might seem politically ambitious, the shift is surely 
inevitable over the longer term. Admittedly, civilization has had to undergo tremendous 
humanitarian catastrophes in order to achieve regulatory advances of this magnitude in the past, 
but perhaps a spirit of frank criticism, open debate and political engagement in this generation 
might spare our sons and daughters a future that is as violent as our past.  
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